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Abstract
This paper presents an approach to automatic verica-
tion of asynchronous round-based consensus algorithms.
We use model checking, a widely practiced verication
method; but its application to asynchronous distributed al-
gorithms is difcult because the state space of these algo-
rithms is often innite. The proposed approach addresses
this difculty by reducing the verication problem to small
model checking problems that involve only single phases
of algorithm execution. Because a phase consists of a -
nite number of rounds, bounded model checking, a tech-
nique using satisability solving, can be effectively used to
solve these problems. The proposed approach allows us to
model check some consensus algorithms up to around 10
processes.
1. Introduction
Model checking, a method for formally verifying state
transition systems, has now become popular, because it al-
lows the fully automatic analysis of designs. This paper
presents an approach to model checking of asynchronous
consensus algorithms. Consensus is central to the con-
struction of fault-tolerant distributed systems. For exam-
ple, atomic broadcast, which is at the core of state machine
replication, can be implemented as a sequence of consen-
sus instances [3]. Other services, such as view synchrony
and membership, can also be constructed using consen-
sus [16, 25]. Because of the importance, much research has
been being devoted to developing new algorithms for this
problem.
Model checking of asynchronous consensus algorithms
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is difcult, because these algorithms usually induce an in-
nite state space, making model checking infeasible. Sources
of innite state spaces include unbounded round num-
bers and unbounded message channels. In our previous
work [26], we succeeded in model checking several asyn-
chronous consensus algorithms by adopting a round-based
computation model, called the Heard-Of (HO) model [6],
and by devising a nite abstraction of unbounded round
numbers. The scalability, however, still needs to be ad-
dressed, because the system size that can be model checked
is rather small, typically three or four processes.
In this paper we present a different approach for the ver-
ication of asynchronous consensus algorithms. Our ap-
proach divides the verication problem into several prob-
lems that can be solved by model checking. Importantly,
these model checking problems can be solved by only an-
alyzing single phases of the execution of the consensus al-
gorithm. Because of this property of the problems, bonded
model checking [9] can be very effectively used. Through
case studies, we show that the time and memory space re-
quired for verication can be signicantly reduced, result-
ing in increasing the size of systems that can be veried.
Related Work Several attempts have been reported to
model check consensus algorithms. The TLA specica-
tions of some Paxos algorithms [15, 23] were debugged
with the aid of TLC, the TLA model checker. The mod-
els that were model checked consisted of two or three pro-
cesses and a small number of rounds [22]. In [27], an
approach to automatic discovery of consensus algorithms
was proposed. This approach depends on a procedure that
determines if a given decision rule satises the required
safety properties of a single phase of a full-information
exchange consensus algorithm. This procedure cannot be
used for liveness verication or to verify an entire consen-
sus algorithm. In [17], a synchronous consensus algorithm
was model checked for three processes. Studies on model
checking of shared memory-based randomized consensus
algorithms can be found in [7, 20]. Model checking of
Byzantine agreement protocols was studied in [1] and [19].
A synchronous system model was assumed in [1]. In [19]
an asynchronous algorithm was veried but manual proof
was used with combination of model checking.
The verication approach proposed in this paper can be
viewed as a variation of k-induction. Although in differ-
ent contexts, combining bounded model checking and k-
induction was studied in, for example, [10].
Roadmap This paper is structured as follows: Section 2
describes the HO model and the consensus problem. Sec-
tion 3 and Section 4 describe our proposed model checking
techniques for verication of safety and liveness, respec-
tively. Section 5 proposes automatic procedures for val-
idating two important assumptions used in the safety and
liveness verication. Section 6 shows the results of case
studies. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Consensus in the Heard-Of Model
The HO model [6] is a communication-closed round
model that generalizes the asynchronous round model by
Dwork et al. [12] with some features of [14] and [24].
Let ¦ = f1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ng be the set of processes. An al-
gorithm proceeds in phases, each of which consists of
k (¸ 1) rounds.1 An algorithm comprises, for each process
pand each round r, a sending function Srp and a transition
functionT rp . In each round r, every process p sends mes-
sages according to Srp(sp), where sp is the state of p. Then,
pmakes a state transition according to T rp (Msg; sp), where
Msg is the collection of all messages that p has received in
round r.
In the HO model both synchrony degree and faults are
represented in the form of transmission faults. We denote
by HO(p; r) (µ ¦) the set of processes from which p re-
ceives a message in round r: HO(p; r) is the heard of set
of p in round r. A transmission fault is a situation where
q 62 HO(p; r) while q sent (or was supposed to send) a
message to p in round r. Transmission faults can occur if
messages missed a round due to the asynchrony of commu-
nication and processing, or if a process or a link is faulty.
Consensus is the problem of getting all processes to
agree on the same decision. Each process is assumed to
have a proposed value at the beginning and is required to
eventually decide on a value proposed by some process. In
the HOmodel, consensus is specied by the following three
conditions:
Integrity Any decision value is the proposed value of some
process.
Agreement No two processes decide differently.
Termination All processes eventually decide.
1In [3] and [21], a round is decomposed in phases. Round and
phase are swapped here to use the classical terminology [12].
Algorithm 1 The LastVoting (Paxos) algorithm [6]
1: Initialization:
2: xp 2 V al, initially vp fvp is the proposed value of p.g
3: votep 2 V al [ f?g, initially ?
fV al is the set of values that may be proposed.g
4: commitp a Boolean, initially false
5: readyp a Boolean, initially false
6: tsp 2 N, initially 0 fN is the set of non-negative integers.g
7: Round r = 4Á¡ 3 :
8: Srp :
9: send hxp ; tspi to Coord(p; Á)
10: T rp :
11: if p = Coord(p; Á) and number of hº ; µi received> n=2 then
12: let µ be the largest µ from hº ; µi received
13: votep := one º such that hº ; µi is received
14: commitp := true
15: Round r = 4Á¡ 2 :
16: Srp :
17: if p = Coord(p; Á) and commitp then
18: send hvotepi to all processes
19: T rp :
20: if received hvi from Coord(p; Á) then
21: xp := v ; tsp := Á
22: Round r = 4Á¡ 1 :
23: Srp :
24: if tsp = Á then
25: send hacki to Coord(p; Á)
26: T rp :
27: if p = Coord(p; Á) and number of hacki received> n=2 then
28: readyp := true
29: Round r = 4Á :
30: Srp :
31: if p = Coord(p; Á) and readyp then
32: send hvotepi to all processes
33: T rp :
34: if received hvi from Coord(p; Á) then
35: DECIDE(v)
36: if p = Coord(p; Á) then
37: readyp := false
38: commitp := false
For most consensus algorithms, integrity is trivially sat-
ised; thus we limit our discussion to the verication of
agreement and termination. Note that in the HO model the
termination property requires all processes to decide. Dis-
cussion of the reason for this specication can be found in
[5, 6].
The above computation model can naturally be ex-
tended to represent coordinator-based algorithms. Let
Coord(p; Á) denote the coordinator process of process p
in phase Á. The sending function and the state transition
function are now represented as Srp(sp; Coord(p; Á)) and
T rp (Msg; sp; Coord(p; Á)), where Á is the phase that round
r belongs to. The LastVoting algorithm (Algorithm 1) is
an example of a coordinator-based consensus algorithm [6].
This algorithm can be viewed as an HO model-version of
Paxos [21]. LastVoting is also close to the 3S consensus
algorithm [3].
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Since there is no deterministic consensus algorithm in a
pure asynchronous system, some synchrony condition must
be assumed to solve the problem. In the HO model such
a condition is represented as a predicate over the collec-
tions of HO sets (HO(p; r))p2¦;r>0 and of coordinators
(Coord(p; Á))p2¦;Á>0. For example, the following predi-
cate species a sufcient condition for the LastVoting algo-
rithm to solve consensus:
9Á0 > 0;9co 2 ¦;8p 2 ¦ :
(co = Coord(p; Á0))
^ (jHO(co; 4Á0 ¡ 3)j > n=2)
^ (jHO(co; 4Á0 ¡ 1)j > n=2)
^ (co 2 HO(p; 4Á0 ¡ 2)) ^ (co 2 HO(p; 4Á0))
(1)
In words, phase Á0 is a synchronous phase where: all pro-
cesses agree on the same coordinator co; co can hear from
a majority of processes in the rst and third rounds of that
phase; and every process can hear from co in the second and
fourth rounds. If such a phase Á0 occurs, then all processes
will make a decision at the end of this phase. This condi-
tion is required only for termination. Agreement can never
be violated no matter how bad the HO set is. For simplic-
ity, in the paper we limit our discussion to verication of
such algorithms  algorithms that are always safe, even in
completely asynchronous runs.
3. Verication of Agreement
In this section, we present our approach to the verica-
tion of agreement. The verication of termination is dis-
cussed in Section 4.
Our reasoning consists of two levels. Section 3.1
presents the phase-level reasoning, which shows that agree-
ment verication can be accomplished by examining only
single phases of algorithm execution. Section 3.2 then de-
scribes how model checking can be used to analyze the sin-
gle phases at the round level.
3.1. Phase Level Analysis
At the upper-level of our reasoning, we perform a phase-
wise analysis, rather than round-wise. We dene a cong-
uration as a (n + 1)-tuple consisting of the states of the n
processes and the phase number. Let C be the set of all pos-
sible congurations; that is,
C = S1 £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ Sn £ N+
where Sp is a set of states of a process p and N+ is
a set of positive integers. Given a conguration c =
(s1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; sn; Á) 2 C, we denote by Á(c) the phase num-
ber Á of c. It should be noted that the state of a process is
a value assignment to the variables of the process. Hence
ci ci+1ci-1 ci+2
c1 ck+1c2 ck
Phase iPhase i-1 Phase i+1
Figure 1. Transitions of congurations at the
phase level (top) and at the round level (bot­
tom).
any set of congurations can be represented by a predicate
over the process variables of all processes and Á; that is,
the predicate represents a set of congurations for which it
evaluates to true. We therefore use the notions of a set of
congurations and of such a predicate interchangeably.
Let V al be the set of values that may be proposed. We
dene a ternary relation R µ C £ 2V al £ C as follows:
(c; d; c0) 2 R iff the system can transit from the congu-
ration c at the beginning of phase Á(c) to the next cong-
uration c0 at the beginning of the next phase Á(c0) while
deciding the values in d during phase Á(c). By denition
Á(c) + 1 = Á(c0) if (c; d; c0) 2 R.
Let Init be the set of the congurations that can occur
at the beginning of phase 1. We dene a run as an innite
sequence c1d1c2d2 ¢ ¢ ¢ (ci 2 C; di µ V al) such that c1 2
Init and (ci; di; ci+1) 2 R for all i ¸ 1. We let Run
denote the set of all runs. Let Reachable be a set of all
congurations that can occur in a run; that is, Reachable =
fc j 9c1d1c2d2 ¢ ¢ ¢ 2 Run; 9i ¸ 1 : c = cig. We say that a
conguration c is reachable iff c 2 Reachable. Agreement
holds iff:
8c1d1c2d2 ¢ ¢ ¢ 2 Run :
¯¯¯ [
i>0
di
¯¯¯
· 1 (2)
The key feature of our verication approach is that it can
determine whether Formula (2) holds or not without explor-
ing all runs. In doing this, the notion of univalence plays a
crucial role. A conguration is said to be univalent if there
is only one value that can be decided from this congura-
tion [13]. If the conguration is univalent and v is the only
value that can be decided, then the conguration is said to
be v-valent. Formally:
Denition 1 (Univalence)A conguration ci is v-valent iffS
j¸i dj = ; or
S
j¸i dj = fvg holds for every sequence
cidici+1di+1 ¢ ¢ ¢ such that 8j ¸ i : (cj ; dj ; cj+1) 2 R.
By denition, any conguration next to a v-valent congu-
ration is also v-valent. That is, we have:
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Lemma 1 If c is a v-valent conguration, then any c0 such
that (c; d; c0) 2 R is v-valent.
In the proposed verication approach, we assume that
some property, represented by U(v) and Inv, holds on the
algorithm under verication. U(v) is shown below. The
assumption for Inv will be described later. Indeed, we will
have to validate U(v) and Inv.
Assumption 1 (U(v)): For any v 2 V al, U(v) is a set of
congurations such that if c 2 U(v)\Reachable, then c is
v-valent. In other words, any conguration in U(v) is either
(i) reachable and v-valent or (ii) unreachable.
Example 1 In many consensus algorithms, a majority quo-
rum of processes is used to lock a decision value. This is
also true of the LastVoting algorithm. A reachable cong-
uration is v-valent if a majority of processes have the same
estimate v for the decision value and have greater times-
tamps than the other processes. Thus we have:
U(v) :=
9Q µ ¦ :
½ jQj > n=2 ^
8p 2 Q : (xp = v ^ 8q 2 ¦nQ : tsp > tsq)
The following theorem states that agreement holds if,
whenever some processes decide in a phase, the decided
values are the same (say v), and the conguration at the be-
ginning of the next phase is in U(v).
Theorem 1 Agreement holds if:
8c 2 Reachable : 8(c; d; c0) 2 R :
d = ; _ 9v 2 V al : (d = fvg ^ c0 2 U(v)) (3)
Proof We show that for any c1d1c2d2 ¢ ¢ ¢ 2 Run, (3) im-
plies that for any l ¸ 1, either (i) S0<i·l di = ; or (ii) for
some v 2 V al, S0<i·l di = fvg and cl 2 U(v), meaning
that (2) holds. The proof is by induction on l.
Base case: (3) implies that either d1 = ; or d1 = fvg ^
c2 2 U(v) for some v 2 V al.
Inductive step: Suppose that the above (i) or (ii) holds
for some l ¸ 1. If (i) holds for l, then dl+1 = ; or dl+1 =
fvg^cl+1 2 U(v) for some v 2 V al. Hence (i) or (ii) holds
for l + 1. If (ii) holds for l, then dl+1 = ; or dl+1 = fvg
since cl 2 U(v). Also cl+1 2 U(v) by Lemma 1. Thus (ii)
also holds for l + 1. ¤
It should be noted that Formula (3) only refers to indi-
vidual phase-level transitions from Reachable, rather than
to runs. This property is critical for reducing the verica-
tion problem to a model checking problem of single phases.
However, directly checking this formula would do little
good, because roughly speaking, obtaining Reachable is
as hard as examining all runs.
The key here is that Reachable can be substituted by its
over-approximation. An over-approximation of the set of
reachable states is usually referred to as an invariant.
Denition 2 (Invariant) A set of congurations is an in-
variant iff it contains all reachable congurations.
We assume that an invariant Inv is available:
Assumption 2 (Inv): A set Inv of congurations is an in-
variant; that is, Reachable µ Inv.
Example 2 It is easy to see that for LastVoting, the fol-
lowing predicate is always true at the beginning of every
phase Á:
Inv := 8p 2 ¦ :
½
commitp = false
^ readyp = false ^ tsp < Á
Theorem 2 Agreement holds if:
8c 2 Inv : 8(c; d; c0) 2 R :
d = ; _ 9v 2 V al : (d = fvg ^ c0 2 U(v)) (4)
Proof Because Reachable µ Inv, (4) implies (3). By
Theorem 1, (3) implies agreement. ¤
This theorem leads directly to the following verication
steps:
Step A1: Check if (4) holds or not.
Step A2: If (4) holds, then agreement holds. Otherwise,
further analysis is needed because in this case (i) the
consensus algorithm is incorrect or (ii) U(v) or Inv
are too small or too large, respectively.
3.2. Model Checking of Single Phases
This section shows how model checking can be used to
determine if Formula (4) holds or not. Model checking is
the process of exploring a state transition system to deter-
mine whether or not a given property holds. Since our prob-
lem involves only single phases, we only need to consider
k consecutive state transitions of the consensus algorithm,
where k is the number of rounds per phase (see Section 2).
The behavior of the system in a single phase,
say phase ©, can be represented as a tuple
(c1ho1dv1c2ho2dv2 ¢ ¢ ¢ ckhokdvkck+1; Coord), where
² ci (1 · i · k) is the conguration at the beginning of
the i-th round of the phase, i.e., round k ¤ (©¡ 1) + i,
while ck+1 corresponds to the rst round of the next
phase (see Figure 1). Hence © = Á(c1) = Á(c2) =
¢ ¢ ¢ = Á(ck) and ©+ 1 = Á(ck+1).
² hoi = (HO(1; k(©¡1)+i)); ¢ ¢ ¢ ;HO(n; k(©¡1)+
i))) is a collection of n HO sets  one per process  in
the i-th round.
² dvi = (dvi1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; dvin), where dvip 2 V al [ f?g for
any p 2 ¦, is the collection of values decided by each
process in the i-th round. If a process p does not decide
in the round, then dvip =?.
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² Coord = (Coord(1;©); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Coord(n;©)) is a col-
lection of n coordinators  one per process  in
phase ©.
We call such a tuple a one-phase execution iff it is con-
sistent with the given consensus algorithm.2 By deni-
tion, (c; d; c0) 2 R iff there is a one-phase execution
(c1ho1dv1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ckhokdvkck+1; Coord) such that c = c1,
c0 = ck+1, and d =
¡S
p2¦;1·i·kfdvipg
¢nf?g.
We denote by X the set of all one-phase executions that
need to be examined to check (4): Since we are concerned
with the phase that starts with a conguration in Inv, a one-
phase execution (c1ho1dv1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ckhokdvkck+1; Coord) is in
X iff c1 2 Inv.
Our model checking problem is described as follows:
Given (i) an algorithm to be veried, (ii) U(v), and (iii)
Inv, determine if the following condition holds for all
(c1ho1dv1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ckhokdvkck+1; Coord) 2 X:
d = ; _ 9v 2 V al : (d = fvg ^ ck+1 2 U(v)) (5)
where d =
¡S
p2¦;1·i·kfdvipg
¢nf?g.
Clearly (4) holds iff (5) holds for all one-phase executions
in X .
This model checking problem is unique in that it only
concerns exactly k consecutive transitions. Because of this,
bounded model checking [9] can be most effectively used to
solve this problem. As the name suggests, bounded model
checking searches state transitions of bounded length. This
restriction allows the model checking problem to be reduced
to the satisability problem for a set of constraints in some
logic. The satisability problem is the problem of determin-
ing whether or not values can be assigned to variables such
that all constraints evaluate to true. Bounded model check-
ing can often be used only for nding defects near the initial
states; but in our case it can allow complete verication be-
cause it is already known that the depth of the search space
is exactly k.
Most of the work on bounded model checking is based
on propositional logic. In contrast, in our case the con-
straints are boolean combinations of linear (in)equalities
and boolean expressions with integer and boolean variables.
The variables involved in the constraints are:
² Variables that represent the values of the process vari-
ables at each conguration ci (1 · i · k + 1). If
the process variable is boolean, so is the correspond-
ing representing variable; otherwise the representing
variable is integer.
² An integer variable ©, which represents the phase
number; that is, © = Á(c1) = Á(c2) = ¢ ¢ ¢ = Á(ck).
2Here whether c1 is reachable or not is irrelevant. In other words, a
one-phase execution species how the system would behave in a phase,
provided that the phase begins with c1.
² Boolean variables hoip;q(p; q 2 ¦; 1 · i · k), which
represent whether p hears of q in the i-th round. That
is, q 2 HO(p; k(©¡ 1) + i) iff hoip;q = true.
² Integer variables dvip(p; q 2 ¦; 1 · i · k), which rep-
resent the value that is decided by p in the i-th round.
² Integer variables Coordp(p 2 ¦), which represent the
coordinator of p in phase ©.
It should be noted that any one-phase execution is uniquely
represented as a value assignment to these variables.
Example 3 For the LastVoting algorithm, the variables in-
volved in model checking are: xip; vote
i
p; ts
i
p (integer) and
commitip, ready
i
p (boolean) for p 2 ¦; 1 · i · 5; © (inte-
ger); hoip;q (boolean) for p; q 2 ¦; 1 · i · 4; dvip (integer)
for p 2 ¦; 1 · i · 4; Coordp (integer) for p 2 ¦.
In order to check (5), we proceed as follows. We con-
sider two set of constraints on the above variables:
² X , which represents all one-phase executions in X .
That is, X represents exactly the value assignments to
variables corresponding to a one-phase execution inX .
² U , which represents the value assignments to variables
that correspond to a one-phase execution in X that
does not meet (5).
X is derived from the consensus algorithm and Inv,
while U is derived from U(v). Note that X and U can
only be simultaneously satised by a value assignment cor-
responding to a one-phase execution that (i) belongs to X
and (ii) for which (5) does not hold. Therefore every one-
phase execution inX meets (5) iff X [ U is unsatisable.
Step A1 and Step A2 can now be replaced with Step B1
and Step B2, respectively.
Step B1: Check the satisability of:
X [ U
This check can be done by an off-the-shelf Satisabil-
ity Modulo Theories (SMT) solver, such as Yices [11].
Step B2: If no satisfying value assignment exists, then ev-
ery one-phase execution in X satises (5), meaning
that (4) holds. As a result, it is guaranteed that agree-
ment holds. On the other hand if there is a satisfying
assignment, further analysis is needed to obtain a con-
clusive answer (see Step A2).
We now show how to construct X and U .
Constraints X : X is composed as follows:
X := Dom [ T 1 [ T 2 [ ¢ ¢ ¢ [ T k [ I;
where Dom, T i and I are as follows:
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Dom: Dom restricts the domains of the variables. We
represent the set V al of possible proposed values by the set
of all positive integers and ? by zero. For the LastVoting
algorithm, Dom consists of the following constraints:
² 8p 2 ¦;8i; 1 · i · 5: xip > 0 ^ voteip ¸ 0 ^ tsip ¸ 0
² © > 0
² 8p 2 ¦;8i; 1 · i · 4: dvip ¸ 0
² 8p 2 ¦ : 1 · Coordp · n
T i: T i represents the i-th round of the algorithm; T i is
satisable iff the system's states  represented by the vari-
able values at the beginning of the ith and i+1-th rounds
 are consistent with the algorithm under verication. For
example:
T 3 :=
8p 2 ¦ :
x3p = x
4
p
^ vote3p = vote4p
^ ts3p = ts4p
^ commit3p = commit4p
^ ite(Coordp = p ^_
Q2Maj
^
q2Q
(Coordq = p ^ ts3q = © ^ ho3p;q = true);
ready4p = true; ready3p = ready4p)
^ dv3p = 0
where Maj ´ fQ j Q µ ¦; jQj > n=2g. The rst
four terms express that process variables xp, votep, tsp and
commitp do not change in the third round. The ite term3
represents how variable readyp is updated: It species that
readyp will be updated to true if p considers itself the
coordinator and receives messages from a majority of pro-
cesses who consider the coordinator to be p (see lines 2427
of Algorithm 1). The last term expresses that no decision is
made in the third round.
I: I enforces that c1 2 Inv. For example, consider Inv
shown in Example 2 that refers to phase ©. In this case we
have:
I := 8p 2 ¦ :
½
commit1p = false
^ ready1p = false ^ ts1p < ©
Constraints U: The negation of (5) is:
d 6= ; ^ 8v 2 V al : :(d = fvg ^ ck+1 2 U(v))
where d =
¡S
p2¦;1·i·kfdvipg
¢nf?g. If v 62 d, then d 6=
fvg, which allows us to replace V al with d:
d 6= ; ^ 8v 2 d : :(d = fvg ^ ck+1 2 U(v))
3ite(a; b; c) = b if a = true; ite(a; b; c) = c, otherwise.
U consists of constraints that represent the above formula.
For example, consider U(v) given in Example 1. Then U
consists of the conjunction of the following constraints:
²
_
p2¦;1·i·k
dvip 6= 0
² 8p 2 ¦;8i; 1 · i · k:
(dvip 6= 0) ¡!
:
0BBBB@
^
q2¦;1·j·k
(dvjq = dv
i
p _ dvjq = 0)
^
_
Q2Maj
^
q2Q
0@ xk+1q = dvip^ ^
q02¦nQ
tsk+1q > ts
k+1
q0
1A
1CCCCA
Basically, the second constraint means that some process
has decided (dvip 6= 0) while the conguration is not univa-
lent (:(:::)).
4. Verication of Termination
As stated in Section 2, in the context of the HO model,
the condition for termination is specied by a predicate over
the collections of HO sets and coordinators.
In this section we consider a condition of the form:
9Á > 0 : P sync(Á)
where P sync(Á) is a predicate over the HO sets and the co-
ordinators in phase Á such that:
² P sync(Á) is invariant under phase changes; that is, for
any Á; Á0 > 0, we have P sync(Á) = P sync(Á0) if the
HO sets and the coordinators in phases Á and Á0 are
identical. Because of this property we henceforth de-
note P sync(Á) as P sync.
² P sync is not the constant false.
For example, Condition (1) in Section 2 is of this form. The
verication method described here determines whether the
given algorithm always terminates in a phase where P sync
holds.
Let Rsync µ C £ 2¦ £ C be a ternary relation such that
(c; ¼; c0) 2 Rsync iff whenever phase Á(c) meets P sync,
a one-phase execution from c to c0 is possible in which ¼
is the set of processes that decide. Hence termination is
satised if:4
8c 2 Reachable : (8(c; ¼; c0) 2 Rsync : ¼ = ¦) (6)
Theorem 3 Termination holds if:
8c 2 Inv : (8(c; ¼; c0) 2 Rsync : ¼ = ¦) (7)
4Note that we exclude the exceptional case where no (c; ¼; c0) 2
Rsync exists for some c, because P sync is not the constant false.
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Proof Because Reachable µ Inv (Assumption 2), (7) im-
plies (6). ¤
Whether (7) holds or not can be determined us-
ing bounded model checking, as was done for agree-
ment verication: Let Xsync be the set of all one-
phase executions that start with a conguration in Inv,
and can occur if P sync holds for the phase. That is,
(c1ho1dv1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ckhokdvkck+1; Coord) 2 Xsync iff:
² c1 2 Inv (hence Xsync µ X); and
² P sync holds for the HO sets, ho1; ho2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; hok, and
the coordinators, Coord.
Hence (c; ¼; c0) 2 Rsync iff there is a one-phase execution
(c1ho1dv1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ckhokdvkck+1; Coord) 2 Xsync such that
c = c1, c0 = ck+1, and ¼ = fp j 9i; 1 · i · k : dvip 6= ?g.
The problem we want to solve is to deter-
mine if the following condition (8) holds for all
(c1ho1dv1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ckhokdvkck+1; Coord) 2 Xsync:
8p 2 ¦;9i; 1 · i · k : dvip 6= ? (8)
In words, (8) states that every process decides in some
round of a phase where P sync holds. By denition, (7)
holds iff (8) holds for all executions in Xsync.
The problem of deciding whether all one-phase execu-
tions in Xsync satisfy (8) is reduced to the satisability
problem, as was done in Section 3.2. The constraints to
be checked are:
X [ Sync [ Term
where:
² Sync represents P sync. Sync consists of constraints
over hoip and Coordp (p 2 ¦; 1 · i · k) and is
satised iff P sync holds for the HO sets and the coor-
dinators represented by hoip and Coordp. As a result,
X [ Sync represents Xsync.
² Term is satised by a value assignment corresponding
to a one-phase execution iff it does not meet (8); that
is, some process exists that does not decide in the exe-
cution. Term is composed of only a single constraint:
Term :=
_
p2¦
^
1·i·k
dvip = 0
The constraints X [ Sync [ Term can be simultaneously
satised by, and only by, a value assignment correspond-
ing to a one-phase execution that (i) is in Xsync and (ii)
for which (8) does not hold. Therefore every one-phase ex-
ecution in Xsync satises (8) iff no satisfying assignment
exists. As a result, termination can be veried as follows:
Step C1: Check the satisability of X [ Sync [ Term.
Step C2: If no satisfying value assignment exists, then ev-
ery one-phase execution in Xsync satises (8), mean-
ing that (4) holds. It is therefore guaranteed that ter-
mination holds. On the other hand, if the constraints
are satisable, then it means that (i) the algorithm is
incorrect or (ii) Inv is too large. In this case further
analysis is required to obtain a conclusive answer.
Example 4 Consider condition (1) for termination of
LastVoting. We have:
Sync :=
_
p2¦
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
p = Coord1 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = Coordn
^
_
Q2Maj
^
q2Q
ho1p;q = true
^
_
Q2Maj
^
q2Q
ho3p;q = true
^
^
q2¦
ho2q;p = true
^
^
q2¦
ho4q;p = true
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
5. Validating Inv and U(v)
So far we have assumed that U(v) (see Example 1) and
Inv (see Example 2) satisfy Assumption 1, respectively As-
sumption 2 (see Section 3.1). Here we present automatic
procedures that can check that U(v) and Inv indeed sat-
isfy the corresponding assumptions. We show that with
some minor modications, the model checking technique
described in the previous sections can be used for this pur-
pose.
5.1. Validating Inv
Here we remove Assumption 2; that is, it is not known
whether or not Inv is an invariant.
Theorem 4 Suppose that Inv is a set of congurations.
Inv is an invariant if the following two conditions hold:
Init µ Inv (9)
8c 2 Inv : (8(c; d; c0) 2 R : c0 2 Inv) (10)
Proof By induction we show that for any c1d1c2d2 ¢ ¢ ¢ 2
Run, ci 2 Inv for any i ¸ 1. By denition of Run, c1 2
Init. By (9) c1 2 Inv. Suppose that ci 2 Inv for some
i ¸ 1. Then ci+1 2 Inv by (10). ¤
Test of (9) Testing (9) can be done by searching a cong-
uration that is in Init but not in Inv. This can be conducted
by checking the satisability of the following constraints on
a conguration c1:
Dom [ INIT [ I
where:
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² INIT species that c1 2 Init.
² I species that c1 62 Inv. I is the negation of I, see
Section 3.2.
Condition (9) holds iff no satisfying assignment exists.
Test of (10) Testing whether (10) holds or
not can be done by determining if for all
(c1ho1dv1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ckhokdvkck+1; Coord) 2 X:
ck+1 2 Inv
This problem can be reduced to the satisability problem of
the following constraints:
X [ I 0
where I 0 is satised iff ck+1 62 Inv. Thus if there is no
satisfying solution, then every one-round execution in X
ends with a conguration in Inv, i.e., (10) holds.
I 0 is almost identical to I, except that (i) every rst-
round version variable var1 in I is now replaced with its
k + 1-th version vark+1 and (ii) © is replaced with ©+ 1.
Example 5 Consider the LastVoting algorithm for exam-
ple. In this case we have:
INIT :=
^
p2¦
µ
vote1p =? ^ commit1p = false
^ ready1p = false ^ ts1p = 0
¶
^ © = 1
For the Inv given in Example 2 that refers to phase ©, we
have:
I := :
^
p2¦
µ
commit1p = false
^ready1p = false ^ ts1p < ©
¶
I 0 := :
^
p2¦
µ
commitk+1p = false
^readyk+1p = false ^ tsk+1p < ©+ 1
¶
5.2. Validating U(v) with Assumption 2
Here we remove Assumption 1; that is, it is not known
that U(v) represents v-valent congurations. However, we
assume that Inv correctly represents an invariant; that is,
Reachable µ Inv (Assumption 2).
Theorem 5 Suppose that v 2 V al and U(v) is a set of
congurations. Any c 2 U(v) \Reachable is v-valent if:
8c 2 Inv : 8(c; d; c0) 2 R :
c 2 U(v) ¡! d 2 f;; fvgg ^ c0 2 U(v) (11)
Proof It sufces to show that when (11) holds, for any
ci (i ¸ 1) in any run c1d1c2d2 ¢ ¢ ¢ 2 Run, if ci 2 U(v),
then ci is v-valent. Since Reachable µ Inv, ci 2 Inv for
any i ¸ 1. If ci 2 U(v), then because of (11), di = ; or
di = fvg and ci+1 2 U(v). By induction, for any j ¸ i,
dj = ; or dj = fvg. Hence ci is v-valent. ¤
Again, bounded model checking can be used to check
if (11) holds for all v 2 V al. The problem to be solved
is to determine whether or not for any one-phase execution
(c1ho1dv1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ckhokdvkck+1; Coord) 2 X , the following
condition holds:
8v 2 V al :
c1 2 U(v) ¡! (d = ; _ d = fvg) ^ ck+1 2 U(v)
(12)
where d =
¡S
p2¦;1·i·kfdvipg
¢nf?g.
The problem is reduced to the satisability problem of:
X [ V
where V is satised by a one-phase execution in X iff it
does not meet (12). Therefore if X [ V is unsatisable,
then (12) holds for any execution in X , ensuring that any
c 2 U(v) \Reachable is v-valent.
The variables that occur in V are: process variables at
c1 and ck+1; ©; dvip for all p 2 ¦; i; 1 · i · k; and an
auxiliary integer variable V that represents v in (12).
Example 6 For U(v) shown in Example 1, we have:
V := (V > 0)^
:
0BBBBBBB@
_
Q2Maj
³ ^
p2Q
x1p = V ^
^
q2¦nQ
ts1p > ts
1
q
´
¡!^
p2¦;1·i·k
(dvip = V _ dvip = 0)
^
_
Q2Maj
^
p2Q
³
xk+1p = V ^
^
q2¦nQ
tsk+1p > ts
k+1
q
´
1CCCCCCCA
6. Case Studies
In this section we present the results of applying the pro-
posed approach to two consensus algorithms:
² LastVoting (Paxos) [6], see Algorithm 1.
² Hybrid-1(®), an improved version of the Fast Paxos
algorithm [23], presented in [4], see Algorithm 2.
For LastVoting, the condition for termination is specied
by (1) in Section 2, while U(v) and Inv are given in Exam-
ples 1 and 2.
Similarly to LastVoting, Hybrid-1(®) is always safe if
® · bn=4c. The condition for termination is specied in
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Table 1. Properties for Hybrid-1(®)
(a) Condition for Liveness
9Á > 0;9co 2 ¦;8p 2 ¦ : jHO(p; r)j > max(n=2; 2®) ^ co = Coord(p; Á)
^ 8i; 0 · i · 2 : co 2 HO(p; 3Á¡ i)
(b) U(v) and Inv
U(v) :=
9Q µ ¦ :
 jQj ¸ n¡ ® ^
8p 2 Q : (xp = v) ^ 8p 2 ¦nQ : (tsp = 0)
_
9Q µ ¦ :
 jQj > n=2 ^
8p 2 Q : (xp = v ^ 8q 2 ¦nQ : tsp > tsq)
Inv := 8p 2 ¦ : voteToSendp = false ^ tsp < Á
Table 1(a); U(v) and Inv are given in Table 1(b). Hybrid-
1(®) combines a fast phase and an ordinary phase of Fast
Paxos into the same phase. In the rst round of Phase 1, if
a process has received the same estimate from n ¡ ® pro-
cesses, then the process can immediately decide (line 12).
To prevent processes from deciding different values in later
rounds (line 33), if n¡ ® or more processes have the same
proposed value, then it must be guaranteed that no process
having a different estimate will be allowed to update its
timestamp. That is, when at least n¡ ® processes have the
same estimate v and the remaining processes have a times-
tamp equal to zero, the system must be v-valent. The rst
term of the U(v) in Table 1(b) states this formally.
Experiments: The experiments were performed on a
Linux workstation with an Intel Xeon processor 2.2GHz
and 4Gbyte memory. We used the Yices [11] satisability
solver. For both algorithms, we conducted the four kinds
of checks, namely agreement, termination, U(v), and Inv,
up to n = 11. Table 2 shows the execution time required
for these checks. Notation t.o. (timeout) indicates that the
check was not completed within 5 hours.
No satisable solution was found in any of the checks.
Therefore Table 2 shows that for the two algorithms (i)U(v)
and Inv meet Assumption 1 up to n = 8, Assumption 2 up
to n = 11, and (ii) agreement and termination are guaran-
teed up to n = 8 and n = 11, respectively.
Traditional approach: For comparison, we evaluated a
different approach in which the whole state space of an al-
gorithm is explored with an existing model checker. Specif-
ically we veried LastVoting against the agreement property
Algorithm 2 The Hybrid-1(®) algorithm (® · bn=4c)
1: Initialization:
2: xp 2 V al, initially vp fvp is the initial value of pg
3: votep 2 V al [ f?g, initially ?
4: voteToSendp a Boolean, initially false
5: tsp 2 N, initially 0
6: Round r = 3Á¡ 2 :
7: Srp :
8: send hxp ; tsp; Coord(p; Á)i to all processes
9: T rp :
10: if (Á = 1) and#h¡;¡;¡i ¸ n¡ ® then
11: if n¡ ® messages received are equal to hx;¡;¡i then
12: DECIDE(x)
13: if p = Coord(p; Á) and
#h¡;¡; pi received> max(n=2; 2®) then
14: if the messages received are all equal to h¡; 0; pi
and, except at most ®, are equal to hx; 0; pi then
15: votep := x
16: else
17: let µ be the largest µ from h¡; µ; pi received
18: votep := one x such that hx; µ; pi is received
19: voteToSendp := true
20: Round r = 3Á¡ 1 :
21: Srp :
22: if p = Coord(p; Á) and voteToSendp then
23: send hvotepi to all processes
24: T rp :
25: if received hvi from Coord(p; Á) then
26: xp := v ; tsp := Á
27: Round r = 3Á :
28: Srp :
29: if tsp = Á then
30: send hack; xpi to all processes
31: T rp :
32: if 9v s.t. # hack; vi received> n=2 then
33: DECIDE(v)
34: voteToSendp := false
with three model checkers: NuSMV [8], SPIN [18], and
ALV [2].
SMV and SPIN are the two best known model check-
ers. NuSMV is one of the latest implementations of SMV.
Although SMV and SPIN can only deal with nite state
systems, the abstraction technique proposed in [26] allows
one to model check the whole state space with these model
checkers. In model checking with SPIN we made an ex-
tensive optimization to reduce the state space. Specically
we completely removed the information on HO sets from
the state space, by specifying all possible behaviors as non-
deterministic ones. This optimization does not work for
SMV because HO sets are already compactly represented
by the data structure used in SMV. ALV is a well known
model checker that can analyze innite state systems with
unbounded integer variables. It does not require any nite
state abstraction, while the same optimization as with SPIN
was performed to avoid explicit representation of HO sets.
Table 3 presents the maximum number of processes that
each of the model checkers was able to handle without run-
ning out of memory or time (5 hours) together with the time
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Table 2. Execution time (in seconds)
LastVoting Hybrid-1(bn=4c)
n 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
agreement 0.1 0.3 0.6 5.0 10 139 312 11066 0.1 0.8 2.2 57 539 11848 t.o. t.o.
termination 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.0 3.6 7.6 32 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.1 3.2 13 28 121
U(v) 0.1 0.6 1.7 104 2356 t.o. t.o. t.o. 0.3 2.3 8.2 142 16650 t.o. t.o. t.o.
Inv 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.9 2.7 5.2 29 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.8 2.7 10 26 92
Table 3. Traditional approach on LastVoting
with different model checkers
Model Checker n Time (sec)
NuSMV [8] 4 167
SPIN [18] 3 2922
ALV [2] 3 1921
needed to model check the largest model. Comparing Ta-
bles 2 and 3 one can clearly see that the proposed approach
scales much better than the approach using existing model
checkers. This improvement can be explained by the fact
that our approach can avoid explosive growth of the search
space by limiting it to single phases.
7. Conclusion
We proposed a novel approach to automatic verication
of asynchronous consensus algorithms. Using the notions
of univalence and invariant, we reduced agreement and ter-
mination verication to the problem of model checking only
single phases of the algorithm. This unique property of
the model checking problem allowed us to effectively use
bounded model checking. As case studies we applied the
proposed approach to two consensus algorithms and me-
chanically veried that they satisfy agreement up to 8 pro-
cesses and termination up to 11 processes. Comparing the
performance of the traditional model checking approach
showed that the performance improvement was signicant.
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